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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GINGER E. ROWE, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
NORMAN H. ROWE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 920507-CA 
Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i), as amended. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Rowe raises 11 separate issues. Mrs. Rowe will 
respond to those issues but believes in general there are only 
three relevant issues. 
(1) Did the parties enter into the Stipulation For 
Entry of Judgment. 
This is an issue of fact. The standard of review is 
whether taking all the evidence supporting the court's findings 
and all reasonable inferences to be derived therefrom and viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the court's findings, 
are the court's findings clearly erroneous. College Irrigation 
Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Company. 780 P.2d 
1241 (Utah 1989). 
(2) If the parties entered into the Stipulation, is 
the Stipulation enforceable. 
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This involves mixed questions of fact and law. To the 
extent this issue involves questions of law, the lower court's 
conclusions are accorded no particular deference and this court 
reviews them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 
(Utah 1989). To the extent this issue involves questions of 
fact, the standard of review is whether taking all the evidence 
supporting the court's findings and all reasonable inferences to 
be derived therefrom and viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court's findings, are the court's findings 
clearly erroneous. College Irrigation Co. v. Logan River & 
Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Company. 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989). 
(3) If the Stipulation is not enforceable, is the 
Satisfaction of Judgment, which was given as a result of the 
Stipulation, valid. 
This involves mixed questions of fact and law. To the 
extent this issue involves questions of law, the lower court's 
conclusions are accorded no particular deference and this court 
reviews them for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 
(Utah 1989). To the extent this issue involves questions of 
fact, the standard of review is whether taking all the evidence 
supporting the court's findings and all reasonable inferences to 
be derived therefrom and viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court's findings, are the court's findings 
clearly erroneous. College Irrigation Co. v. Logan River & 
Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Company. 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.3 and Rule 
4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial Administration may be 
determinative. [Addendum no. 1]. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Mrs. Rowe filed an Order to Show Cause why her former 
husband should not be held in contempt for failure to pay child 
support pursuant to a Stipulation For Entry of Judgment. Mr. 
Rowe contended the Stipulation was not enforceable. The court 
found the Stipulation was enforceable and Mr. Rowe appeals that 
decision. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Rowe obtained a decree of divorce in Texas 
on September 19, 1986. [R.18]. The Rowes had three children by 
their marriage: two boys, Brooke and Brayton, and one girl, 
Britinee. [R.17]. Custody of the children was awarded to Mrs. 
Rowe. [R.17]. The decree obligated Mr. Rowe to pay a total of 
$700 per month child support. [R.15]. 
On January 15, 1988, Mrs. Rowe filed a Petition to 
Amend Decree of Divorce, case no. 88-440078, seeking to increase 
child support payments from Mr. Rowe. [R.22]. On February 17, 
1989, an administrative law case was brought against Mr. Rowe for 
unpaid child support. [R.144]. Judgment by default was 
eventually entered against Mr. Rowe in the administrative action. 
[Mr. Rowe's Brief, p.13]. Mrs. Rowe filed an Amended Petition on 
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March 16, 1989 which included a request for enforcement of unpaid 
child support. [R.93]. 
To settle their dispute, Mr. and Mrs. Rowe entered into 
a Stipulation For Entry of Judgment on September 10, 1989. 
[R.108]. The essence of the Stipulation was that Mrs. Rowe would 
receive additional child support and, for $11,000, release her 
claims for all monies owed by Mr. Rowe from the date of divorce 
through July 1, 1989. [R.108, H 1-3]. In return, Mr. Rowe 
would receive a satisfaction of judgment in the administrative 
proceeding. [R.108, 13]. 
In reliance on the Stipulation Mrs. Rowe executed a 
Satisfaction of Judgment on September 26, 1989. [R.134]. On 
October 6, 1989, Mrs. Rowe received a check for $12,600. 
[R.136]. The $12,600 was designated as $11,000 to satisfy the 
Judgment and $1,600 for child support for the months of August 
and September, 1989.1 [R.136]. 
On September 26, 1989, Mrs. Rowe sent the Stipulation 
to Commissioner Howard H. Maetani along with a cover letter. 
[R.103]. The letter indicated Mr. Rowe agreed to pay court costs 
and recording fees. The letter also indicated Mrs. Rowe was no 
longer represented by counsel. On approximately October 20, 
1989, Mrs. Rowe's former attorney officially withdrew as counsel. 
[R. 170, f 13]. Mr. Rowe received a copy of Mrs. Rowe's letter 
to the court on or before November 1989. [R.195, 15]. Mr. 
1
 The Stipulation allowed for an increase in child support 
to $800 per month from August through December, 1989. [R.108, 1 
2]. 
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Rowe's attorney, Mr. Dodd, states he submitted the Stipulation 
and an Order to Commissioner Howard H. Maetani on November 20, 
1989. [R. 170, f 17]. 
Sometime in November, Commissioner Maetani telephoned 
Mr. Dodd and stated he could not sign the Order approving the 
Stipulation unless he had documents to substantiate the parties' 
financial status, in compliance with the Child Support 
Guidelines. [R.170, fl9]. Mr. Dodd contacted Mr. Rowe and 
advised him of the need for the additional documents. [R.170, f 
20]. Mr. Dodd did not contact Mrs. Rowe regarding the need for 
additional documents. [R.170]. Mr. Rowe did not tell Mrs. Rowe 
of the court's request for financial documents. [R. 195 & 191]. 
Mr. Rowe failed to forward any financial documents to 
the court. [R.170, f21]. On January 18, 1990, the court 
returned the Stipulation and Order to Mr. Dodd, informing him 
they could not be accepted unless supported by financial 
documents. [R. 170, f 20]. Mr. Dodd again did not inform Mrs. 
Rowe of the need for financial documents. [R.170]. There is no 
indication the court informed Mrs. Rowe of the need for 
additional documents. 
Mr. Rowe made child support payments in accordance with 
the Stipulation. [R. 136; R. 187, check nos. 102 & 103]. 
Nevertheless, in September, 1990, Mr. Rowe wrote Mrs. Rowe that 
the Stipulation was not valid because the court never signed the 
Stipulation and the court lacked jurisdiction. [R.191]. Mr. 
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Rowe, however, continued to make child support payments pursuant 
to the Stipulation. [R. 176, check no. 162]. 
On March 18, 1991, the court issued an Order to Show 
Cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. [R.88]. The case was dismissed without prejudice on 
April 15, 1991. [R.96]. 
On February 5, 1992, Mr. Rowe petitioned the court, 
case no. 92-4400164, for modification of the Texas divorce decree 
regarding child support payments. [R.25 of file 92-4400164]. On 
February 14, 1992, Mrs. Rowe filed an Order to Show Cause why Mr. 
Rowe should not be held in contempt for failure to pay child 
support in accordance with the Stipulation. [R.100 & 98]. On 
February 28, 1992, Mrs. Rowe requested case no. 92-4400164 be 
consolidated with case no. CV-88-78. [R.30 of file 92-4400164]. 
The parties appeared before Commissioner Maetani on 
Mrs. Rowe's Order to Show Cause on March 17, 1992. At the 
hearing, Mr. Rowe argued the Stipulation was not in effect 
because: (1) the issue had been resolved when both parties agreed 
to drop it [R. 733, 736, 739, 740]; (2) the Stipulation never 
became an order [R. 735]; (3) Mr. Rowe had five documents signed 
by each party proving the Stipulation had been rescinded [R. 
736]; (4) the parties reached a subsequent agreement [R.734]; and 
(5) the court lacked jurisdiction [R. 739-740, 752-753]. 
The court found the parties entered into the 
Stipulation and the Stipulation was enforceable. [R.298, f1 2 & 
3]. The court also ruled the Stipulation was effective from the 
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time of signing. [R.753]. The court accepted the Stipulation 
because: (1) the parties entered into it; (2) the parties relied 
on it; and (3) the court believed Mr. Dodd had not filed the 
Stipulation with the court. [R.298, ?2]. 
The court accepted the Stipulation without obtaining 
documents verifying the parties' financial status. Nevertheless, 
the child support amounts required by the Stipulation exceeded 
the amounts required by the Guidelines. [Addendum no. 2]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Stipulation was entered into by Mr. and Mrs. Rowe 
and both parties relied on it. When the Court ultimately 
accepted the Stipulation, it did not require the supporting 
financial documents required by the Child Support Guidelines, nor 
did it strictly enforce Rule 4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. If those be errors, they were harmless. The 
Guidelines set minimum amounts a parent is to pay for child 
support. The Stipulation required child support payments well in 
excess of the minimum requirements. Any deficiency in the 
application of Rule 4-504(8) was do to the conduct of Mr. Rowe or 
his attorney, not Mrs. Rowe. 
Mr. Rowe's other arguments about the unenforcability of 
the Stipulation either are not relevant, raised for the first 
time on appeal and/or based on distorted facts. Further, Mr. 
Rowe has not properly marshalled the evidence. 
Mrs. Rowe gave her former husband a Satisfaction of 
Judgment in reliance on the Stipulation. If the Court determines 
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the Stipulation is not enforceable, the Court must declare the 
Satisfaction of Judgment null and void. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE STIPULATION WAS VALID 
A, The Parties Entered Into The Stipulation 
The court found the parties entered into the 
Stipulation on September 10, 1989. [R.298, f 2]. Several facts 
support the court's finding. First, the Stipulation itself 
contains the notarized signature of both parties. [R.108]. 
Also, Mr. Rowe admits entering into the Stipulation: "To settle 
said case, the parties entered into a stipulation." [Mr. Rowe's 
Brief, p.4]. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to 
Mrs. Rowe, along with all reasonable inferences, the court's 
finding that the parties entered into the Stipulation is not 
clearly erroneous and should be presumed correct. 
B. The Stipulation Is Enforceable 
The court found the Stipulation was enforceable. 
[R.298, If 2 & 3]. Mr. Rowe raises several arguments against its 
enforcement. 
1. Whether the Stipulation is Binding on the Court is not 
Relevant. 
Mr. Rowe argues the Stipulation was not binding on the 
court and the court had discretion to set it aside. These are 
correct statements of the law, but they are not relevant. The 
issue is not whether the Stipulation is binding on the court, but 
whether it is binding on Mr. Rowe. Further, no one forced the 
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court to accept the Stipulation. It did so after hearing and 
argument of counsel. That is why Mr. Rowe is appealing. 
Mr. Rowe also cites authority that a party can 
repudiate a stipulation if it is justified in law or equity and 
if it is timely. Kline v. Kline, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975). Mr. 
Rowe cites no facts nor makes any claim, however, that the 
parties repudiated the Stipulation. Nor could he. In this case, 
Mr. and Mrs. Rowe signed a written stipulation. [R.108]. Mrs. 
Rowe executed a Satisfaction of Judgment in reliance on the 
Stipulation. [R.134]. Mr. Rowe paid child support pursuant to 
the Stipulation for several months. [R.136; 187, check nos. 103 
& 103; 176 check no. 162]. As stated in Kline, whether a party 
agrees to a stipulation is a question of fact. Kline at 476. As 
described in detail in Point I.A. above, the court's factual 
finding that the parties entered into the Stipulation, is 
presumed correct. 
Mr. Rowe's arguments of the binding effect of the 
Stipulation on the court and the court's ability to refuse to 
accept a stipulation are irrelevant. The real issue is whether 
the Stipulation is binding on the parties. 
2. The Statutory Requirements Were Satisfied. 
Mr. Rowe next claims the Stipulation is not enforceable 
because Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.3 and Rule 4-504 of the Judicial 
Code of Administration were not met. 
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(a) The court'& failure to require financial documents 
was harmless error because the purpose of S 78-45-
7.3 was met, 
Mr. Rowe claims the Stipulation violated Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.3(3) because it lacked the appropriate supporting 
documents. Section 78-45-7.3(3) currently states2: 
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving 
parties shall submit: 
(1) a completed child support worksheet; 
(2) the financial verification required by 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(3) a written statement indicating whether or not 
the amount of child support requested is consistent 
with the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall 
be used to review the adequacy of a child support order 
negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined 
child support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines 
if the stipulated child support amount or combined amount 
exceeds the total child support award required by the 
guidelines. When the stipulation amount exceeds the 
guidelines, it may be awarded without a finding under 
Section 78-45-7.2. 
Mr. Rowe focuses solely on provision 3(a) and correctly 
notes the required documents were not submitted to the court. 
This, however, does not end the inquiry. It is not enough merely 
2
 During the relevant time period (September, 1989), the 
statute read slightly different. As stated in the Amended Notes 
to § 78-45-7.3: 
The 1990 amendment . . . in Subsection (3), divided former 
Subsection (a) to form present Subsections (a) and (b), 
rewrote Subsection (a), which had read "If a stipulation is 
submitted as a basis for establishing or modifying child 
support, each parent shall present financial verification 
required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(4) and an affidavit fully 
disclosing the financial status of each parent, as required 
for use of the guidelines," and redesignated former 
Subsection (b) as Subsection (c). 
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to show error, the error must be harmful. An error is harmful 
only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently 
high that it undermines the confidence in the court's ruling. 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
As demonstrated below, the parties financial documents would have 
shown the child support required by the Stipulation exceeded the 
minimum amount required by the Child Support Guidelines. Thus, 
the court's error was harmless because the purpose of U.C.A. § 
78-45-7.3 was met. 
Judge Judith M. Billings, who chaired the task force on 
the adoption of Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines, noted 
one of the primary reasons guidelines were implemented was the 
belief that child support orders were being set too low. J.M. 
Billings, From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L.Rev. 859, 878. The 
problem of low child support was especially true in stipulated 
matters. Id. at 910. Judge Billings believed the current 
Guidelines, while an improvement, were still set too low. 
Concluding her article, Judge Billings noted: "Because the 
guidelines adopted by the Utah Legislature are on the low end of 
the spectrum, Utah judges should consider them a minimum, not a 
maximum." Id. at 933. This idea is reflected in § 78-45-
7.3(3)(c) which states that if the child support amount exceeds 
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what is required by the Guidelines, it is deemed adequate and may 
be awarded without a finding under § 78-45-7.2.3 
The Stipulation ordered $266.67 a month per child 
beginning August 1, 1989 and increased to $300 a month per child 
beginning January 1, 1990. [R. 108, p.2]. Mr. Rowe#s Answer to 
Petition to Amend Decree of Divorce and Counterclaim, claims he 
made only $8,500 in 1986 and had no income in 1987 and 1988. 
[R.55, p.3]. Mr. Rowe's gross income for 1990 was $13,485. 
[R.359]. In determining the amount of child support under the 
Guidelines in 1989, the court would have relied on Mr. Rowe's 
1988 tax return.4 According to Mr. Rowe's Answer, he had no 
income in 1988. [R.55, p.8]. Under the Guidelines, a father 
with three children and no income must pay $10 per month, per 
child. [Addendum no. 2]. Even under Mr. Rowe's 1990 income 
level, he would have been required to pay only $115 per month, 
per child. [Addendum]. These calculations give Mr. Rowe the 
benefit of the doubt by assuming Mrs. Rowe earned no income. Any 
3
 U.C.A. § 78-45-7.2 concerns the application of the 
Guidelines and states the Guidelines are a rebuttable 
presumption. 
4
 The record contains no specific information about Mr. 
Rowe's 1989 income. Nevertheless, the instructions for the Child 
Support Worksheet state: "All income must be verified. 
Verification includes . . . the last year's tax return. . . . " 
[Addendum No. 2]. 
Further, it is Mr. Rowe's burden to show he was 
prejudiced by the court's ruling. Mr. Rowe's brief provides no 
information regarding his 1989 income which would verify that the 
Stipulation required him to pay less than what was required by 
the Guidelines. 
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income earned by Mrs. Rowe would further reduce Mr. Rowe's child 
support obligation.5 
It is clear the Stipulation provided for child support 
at a level far above that required by the Guidelines. Thus, the 
underlying purpose of the Guidelines was met and the technical 
issues argued by Mr. Rowe were harmless. 
(b) Mr. Rowe/s Rule 4-504 argument was not raised in 
the lower court; If any deficiency existed in the 
application of Rule 4-504 it was due to Mr. Rowe's 
or his attorney's conduct; Rule 4-504 is for the 
benefit of the court and in any event, Mr. Rowe 
has shown no prejudice. 
Mr. Rowe claims the Stipulation is unenforceable 
because Rule 4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial Administration was 
not complied with. This issue is being raised for the first time 
on appeal. Commissioner Maetani's ruling regarding the 
Stipulation was appealable to the Fourth District Court. Mr. 
Rowe had an opportunity to make his Rule 4-504 argument at that 
time. He failed to do so. Mr. Rowe's Objection to Order on 
Order to Show Cause and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of the Objection makes no mention of Rule 4-504. [R. 
306]. Mr. Rowe waived his Rule 4-504 argument by failing to 
raise the issue in the District Court. Mascaro v. Davis. 741 
P.2d 938 (Utah 1987). 
For example, if both Mr. and Mrs. Rowe each had a gross 
income of $13,485, Mr. Rowe's child support obligation would be 
$96 per month rather than $115. [Addendum no. 2]. 
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Further, any violation of Rule 4-504(8) was the result 
of the conduct of Mr. Rowe or his attorney. Rule 4-504(8) 
provides: 
No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation 
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in 
writing, signed by the attorneys of record for the 
respective parties and filed with the clerk or the 
stipulation was made on the record. 
The Stipulation was in writing and was filed with the 
court but was not signed by any attorney. [R.108]. At the time 
Mrs. Rowe signed the Stipulation, however, she was not 
represented by counsel. [R. 103]. Further, it was Mr. Rowe's 
attorney who prepared the Stipulation, and it was he who failed 
to provide for counsel's signature and failed to include his own 
signature. [R.170]. Mr. Rowe cannot create a defect in the 
Stipulation and then rely upon that defect in seeking to have the 
Stipulation set aside. Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1175-
76 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . 
Finally, the purpose of Rule 4-504 is: "To establish a 
uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgment and 
decrees to the Court." The Rule appears to be a housekeeping 
matter for the convenience of the court. Even if not, however, 
Mr. Rowe must show he was prejudiced by not having the 
Stipulation signed by an attorney. Steffensen v. Smiths 
Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[T]he 
appellant has the burden of demonstrating an error was 
prejudicial — that there is a 'reasonable likelihood that the 
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error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" (citation 
omitted)). No such prejudice has been alleged or shown. 
3. The Courts Adoption of the Stipulation was Supported 
By Fact. 
Mr. Rowe argues the court committed reversible error in 
accepting the Stipulation because the court was under the 
impression the Stipulation was never filed by Mr. Rowe's 
attorney. The court, however, did not accept the Stipulation 
based solely on its perception that Mr. Rowe's attorney failed to 
file it. As stated in the court's Order, the Stipulation was 
accepted: (1) because the parties entered into it; and (2) the 
parties relied on it. [R.298, fl 2]. Either one of those reasons 
was sufficient for the court to accept the Stipulation. 
4. There was no Waiver of the Stipulation and Mr. Rowe 
Failed to Marshall the Evidence; Equitable Estoppel is 
Raised for the First Time on Appeal and is Not 
Applicable. 
Mr. Rowe claims the Stipulation is not enforceable 
because it was waived by the parties. Mr. Rowe bases this 
argument on the following: Mrs. Rowe failed to insist on the 
adoption of the Stipulation in 1989; Mrs. Rowe failed to provide 
the documents requested by the court; Mrs. Rowe accepted $700 per 
month as per the Texas Decree. [Mr. Rowe's Brief p.17]. Mr. 
Rowe's argument is based on distorted facts. 
The court returned the Stipulation to Mr. Rowe's 
attorney, not to Mrs. Rowe. Mr. Dodd's Affidavit states he 
informed Mr. Rowe of the court's request for supporting 
documents. Mr. Dodd does not claim he told Mrs. Rowe of the need 
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for additional documents. [R.170, f 19]. Mr. Rowe's Affidavit 
states that upon receiving word from his attorney that the court 
rejected the Stipulation, Mr. Rowe passed that information on to 
Mrs. Rowe. [R.195, f 7]. Mr. Rowe's Affidavit, however, does 
not state he told Mrs. Rowe of the court's request for the need 
for supporting documents. [R.195]. Indeed, as stated in Mr. 
Rowe's Affidavit, this conversation is memorialized in a letter 
dated September, 1990. [R.195, f 7] The letter mentions nothing 
about the need for additional documents. [R.191]. In sum, Mr. 
Rowe provides no evidence Mrs. Rowe knew of the need for 
additional documents to support the Stipulation. This much is 
clear, however: Mr. Rowe knew of the need for additional 
documents, but failed to provide them. 
Mr. Rowe also argues that, based on the total amount of 
support he paid, Mrs. Rowe knew he was only complying with the 
Texas Decree. That argument is misleading. Mr. Rowe's child 
support payments actually confirm he was acting in accordance 
with the Stipulation. The Texas decree worked-out to 
approximately $233 per child. The Stipulation, however, required 
$300 per month for each child after January 1, 1990. Check no. 
102, dated January 26, 1990, for $300 is designated "for Britinee 
in Utah." [R. 187]. And, check no. 103, also dated January 26, 
1990, is for $600 and is designated "Feb. support for boys in 
Colorado." [R. 187]. As late as December, 1990, over a year 
after the Stipulation was signed, Mr. Rowe sent a check for $900 
designated as "Dec. child support." [R. 176, check no. 162]. 
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Mr. Rowe's twisting of the facts brings up an important 
point. With regard to factual issues, it is Mr. Rowe's duty to 
marshall all competent evidence that tends to support the court's 
findings. Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Utah 1988). 
[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to 
merely have pertinent excerpts from the record readily 
available to a reviewing court. The marshaling process 
is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient 
to convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Rowe cannot limit his challenge to 
evidence which he claims supports a different finding. Horton v. 
Gem State Mutual of Utah. 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)("Gem State still failed to meet its obligation to marshal 
the evidence by persistently arguing its own position without 
regard for the evidence supporting the trial court's findings . . 
. ." Id.). Mr. Rowe fails to marshal the evidence properly. 
His primary, if not sole, focus is on evidence which he claims 
contradicts the court's findings. Mr. Rowe persistently argues 
his position and rarely marshals any evidence which supports the 
court's findings. When he does marshal some supporting evidence, 
he omits any reference to key evidence supporting the findings. 
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Mr. Rowe failed to properly marshal the evidence. The Court 
should ignore his argument. 
Mr. Rowe also claims Mrs. Rowe is equitably estopped 
from enforcing the Stipulation. This issue is being raised for 
the first time on appeal. Unless equitable estoppel is raised in 
the lower court, the argument is waived. Matter of Estate of 
Justheim. 824 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Rowe had 
an opportunity to make an equitable estoppel argument when he 
appealed the Commissioner's ruling to the District Court. He did 
not. [R. 306]. Thus, the argument is waived. Further, Mr. Rowe 
bases this argument on the same distorted facts described above. 
Again, there has been no marshalling of the evidence. 
5. There was a Meeting of the Minds Concerning the 
Stipulation. 
The essence of this argument is that although Mrs. Rowe 
signed the Stipulation and seeks to enforce it, the Stipulation 
should not be enforced against Mr. Rowe because his former wife 
really did not understand the terms and conditions of the 
Stipulation. [Mr. Rowe's brief, p. 18]. 
Mr. Rowe supports this argument with a letter from Mrs. 
Rowe to the court after the Stipulation had been signed by both 
parties. The letter states Mr. Rowe agreed to pay all court 
costs and recording fees. The Stipulation was silent about 
recording fees but stated each party would pay its respective 
court costs. Mr. Rowe then claims, because of the letter, he 
believed the Stipulation was no longer binding because it was 
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obvious there was no meeting of the minds. Again, Mr. Rowe 
distorts the facts and fails to properly marshall the evidence. 
Mr. Rowe's self serving claim that he did not think the 
Stipulation was enforceable because of Mrs. Rowe's letter, 
appears to have been invented after the fact. As noted above, 
Mr. Rowe abided by the Stipulation for over a year after it was 
signed. Also, when Mr. Rowe wrote his former wife explaining why 
he thought the Stipulation was not valid, he stated: "I also 
informed you that this document [the Stipulation] was not valid 
because the judge never signed the order - and that you were not 
a resident of Utah - but instead of Colorado.ff [R. 191]. No 
mention of Mrs. Rowe's letter. The transcript of the hearing 
before Commissioner Maetani also never mentions Mrs. Rowe's 
letter. [R. 726-757]. Indeed, at the hearing Mr. Rowe stated 
the reasons he thought the Stipulation was not in effect were: 
(1) the issue had been resolved when both parties agreed to drop 
it [R. 733, 736, 739, 740]; (2) the Stipulation never became an 
order [R. 735]; (3) Mr. Rowe had five documents signed by each 
party proving the Stipulation had been rescinded [R. 736]; (4) 
the parties reached a subsequent agreement [R.734]; and (5) the 
court lacked jurisdiction [R. 739-740, 752-753]. It was not 
until after the hearing that Mr. Rowe first came up with the idea 
that there had not been a meeting of the minds. 
Mrs. Rowe never pursued the issue of court costs and 
recording fees and does not now seek those costs and fees. Mrs. 
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Rowe seeks only to enforce the Stipulation as it was written. 
That is all the court found was enforceable. 
6. There Was No Improper Execution. 
Finally, Mr. Rowe claims the court committed reversible 
error because the Order on Order to Show Cause contains only the 
stamped reproduction of the Commissioner's signature. Not only 
is Mr. Rowe grasping at straws, he is factually wrong. True, the 
Order located at R. 296 contains a stamped signature, but that is 
not the original Order. The original Order on Order to Show 
Cause is located at R. 47 in the file of Case No. 92-4400164. 
That case was consolidated with this case by order of the court. 
[R. 199]. The original Order contains Commissioner Maetani's 
actual signature. [Addendum no. 3]. 
II. IF THE STIPULATION IS NOT VALID, THE SATISFACTION OF 
JUDGMENT MUST BE SET ASIDE 
The essence of the Stipulation was that Mrs. Rowe would 
grant Mr. Rowe a satisfaction of judgment if she received $11,000 
and obtained an increase in child support. Mr. Rowe now claims 
the Stipulation was never valid. If that it so, then the 
Satisfaction of Judgment, which Mrs. Rowe granted Mr. Rowe as 
part of the Stipulation, must be set aside. 
Mr. Rowe paid $11,000 as part of the bargain to obtain 
the Satisfaction of Judgement. Mrs. Rowe, however, claims Mr. 
Rowe owed her approximately $40,000 at the time. [R.727]. Mr. 
Rowe disputes that amount (R.743), but that is not the point. 
Mrs. Rowe believed she was giving up a claim to a substantial 
amount of money and in return she obtained an increase in child 
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support. Mr. Rowe now claims he was never bound to pay the 
increased support, but in the same breath claims the Satisfaction 
of Judgment is enforceable. He cannot have it both ways. This, 
too, was a finding of the court. [R.298, 1 2]. 
If the Court determines the Stipulation is invalid, the 
Court must also set aside the Satisfaction of Judgment and allow 
Mrs. Rowe to pursue Mr. Rowe for the additional amounts she 
claims he owes her. The $11,000 Mr. Rowe has already paid should 
be considered a credit for any amounts he ultimately owes her.6 
CONCLUSION 
The Stipulation is enforceable. The lower court's 
Order on Order to Show Cause should be upheld. If the Court 
determines the Stipulation is not enforceable, the Satisfaction 
of Judgment must be set aside. 
DATED: April 26, 1993. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
By /fhjL tJ> /?(**_ 
Re id E. Lewfe5^  
Mark W. May V 
Attorneys for Ginger E. Rowe 
6
 This was the suggestion of the Commissioner. [R.744] 
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